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Abstract 
This paper is based on scientific work in the DLR proposition „Virtual Integration Platform (VIP) 3 – Small 
Supersonic Transport“. It intends to show the market potential of future Supersonic Business Jets (SSBJs) 
and to assess possible modes of operation under consideration of economic, technical and operational 
framework requirements. For this purpose, business aviation as a whole is analysed, including business jet 
manufacturers, the current product range and modes of operation. Physical and technical characteristics of 
supersonic flight and the supersonic overland flight ban are discussed in brief. Furthermore, known SSBJ 
designs are presented. The main work concerns market analysis for private flight in general and for SSBJs in 
particular. Calculations of operational expenses of business aircraft are introduced beside statistics on traffic 
volume and results of a survey among business aviation decision makers. Subsequently, a synthetical 
estimation is given regarding the market potential of particular modes of operation for SSBJs. At last, basic 
requirements are deduced for the SSBJ to be designed in the context of VIP-3. 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Since the retirement of Concorde in 2003, there is no more 
civilian supersonic air transportation. A first in the history 
of mankind, the top speed of a transportation system has 
suffered a setback. The reason therefor appears to be 
quite clear: In spite of essential technical feasibility, none 
of the concepts was economically sustainable over its 
whole life cycle. Each of the several great development 
programs for civil supersonic transports (SSTs) consumed 
enormous financial resources. Even Concorde which 
served for 27 years wasn’t able to return its development 
cost to the slightest extent. 
The failure of large civilian SSTs has yielded the 
awareness that before the start of any new program, an 
economic basis as well as elaborate business and 
operation models have to be developed that at least 
render verisimilar the economic viability of such projects. 
For this reason, so-called supersonic business jets 
(SSBJs) have been designed predominantly in the last two 
decades: Small, privately operated aircraft that are 
assumed to possibly be able to prevail in the marketplace. 
Not only is the interest in SSBJs rooted in human drive for 
progress and speed or in profit seeking. From a scientific 
perspective, it is technology driven: The know-how 
regarding civilian supersonic flight has been existing for 
half a century, and since, basic knowledge has improved 
greatly: Engine technology with new, high-temperature 
materials, for instance; or fly-by-wire that had been 
introduced with Concorde and that is now standard in any 
modern airliner. Moreover, new development methods 
have surfaced, among which the meaning of computer 
aided design and simulation can hardly be overestimated. 
In the VIP-3 project, a competency for holistic assessment 
of small supersonic transports is being developed. This 
includes not only the ability to design SSBJs, but also 
knowledge concerning framework requirements of the air 
transportation system that such an airplane has to prove 
itself in. The aforementioned aircraft design environment is 
being developed at the Institute of Aircraft Design and 
Lightweight Structures (IFL) at the Technical University of 
Brunswick, Germany, by adapting the design framework 
PrADO (Preliminary Aircraft Design and Optimization) for 
supersonic applications. Furthermore, the Institute of 
Aerodynamics and Flow Technology of DLR (DLR-AS) 
engages in flow simulation for low aspect ratio wings. 
The present work, assigned to the institution of Air 
Transportation Systems in DLR (DLR-LY), addresses the 
investigation of economic, technical, and operational 
requirements. 
 
2. BUSINESS AVIATION 
2.1. Business jet manufacturers and models 
Globally, there are 6 established manufacturers of 
purpose-built business jets: US-American Cessna, 
Gulfstream and Hawker, Canadian Bombardier, French 
Dassault Falcon and Brazilian Embraer. 
Except for the latter, no company has managed to gain a 
foothold in this market for three decades. Grob Aerospace 
went bankrupt trying, as well as Sino Swearingen and the 
follow-up association Emivest Aerospace. Several 
enterprises engage in developing entry models; yet even 
there, the market hurdles appear to be relatively high as 
could be seen in the spectacular downfall of promising 
Eclipse Aviation. 
To date, about 40 business jet models are in production, 
several are in an advanced state of development. Since 
SSBJs are commonly agreed to become a heavy and very 
costly class of airplanes, only the largest business aircraft 
are interesting as a reference. Among these, so-called 
ultra long range jets represent the performance leaders. 
Three manufacturers are contending for this particularly 
profitable market segment: Bombardier with its Global 
6000, Dassault Falcon with the 7X and Gulfstream with its 
G550. And the next generation is already projected: 
Gulfstream’s G650 is being flight tested and is scheduled 
for delivery in 2012. With a $64.5M price tag, it is to 
become the most expensive business jet ever, and yet, (or 
as a consequence, respectively,) more than 200 orders 
have accrued. Bombardier announced the introduction of 
the Global 7000 and Global 8000 in a few years; they are 
expected to surpass the G650 both regarding price and 
performance. TABLE 1 depicts specifications of the most 
sophisticated business jets at present. 
TABLE 1. High end 
business jets [1] 
Bombardier 
Global 6000 
Dassault 
Falcon 7X 
Gulfstream 
G650 
Purchasing price $53.25M $48.6M $64.5M 
Service entry 2003 2007 2012 
DOC/h $2984 $2085 n/a 
Typical crew          
(flight deck + cabin) 2 + 2 2 + 1 2 + 2 
Passengers, typ. / 
max. 8 / 19 12 / 19 16 / 19 
External dimensions 
(m): length/span/height 
30.3 / 28,7 / 
7.8 
23.2 / 26.2 / 
8.0 
30.4 / 30.4 / 
7.8 
Cabin dimensions (m): 
length / width / height 
13.2 / 2.50 / 
1.92 
11.9 / 2.35 / 
1.89 
14.3 / 2.59 / 
1.95 
Max. thrust 2 x 65.6 kN 3 x 28.5 kN 2 x 71.6 kN 
Max. takeoff weight 44,450 kg 31,300 kg 45,179 kg 
Max. fuel weight 20,170 kg 14,490 kg 20,050 kg 
Long range cruise 
speed 
470 kn       
(870 km/h) 
459 kn   
(850 km/h) 
488 kn     
(904 km/h) 
High speed cruise 499 kn     (924 km/h) 
498 kn     
(922 km/h) 
516 kn     
(956 km/h) 
Max. cruise Mach 0.89 0.90 0.925 
Balanced field length 1,887 m 1,693 m 1,829 m 
NBAA IFR ranges (200 nm alternate): 
Max. payload 5,756 nm 4,820 nm n/a 
Max. fuel 6,274 nm 5,755 nm n/a 
Reference pax 6,305 nm     (4 pax) 
5,850 nm     
(4 pax) 
7,000 nm     
(8 pax) 
Ferry flight 6,408 nm 5,930 nm n/a 
It shall not be unmentioned that Airbus and Boeing offer 
planes for private purposes as well, which are either highly 
luxurious or fitted with all-business class seats. Those are 
predominantly derivatives from 737 or A320 models and 
their basic price is comparable to the cost of the most 
expensive business jets. About 15 to 20 so-called bizliners 
are delivered yearly. Yet, such jets are ordered to satisfy 
exalted space requirements and thus are not considered 
apt as a reference for distinctly smaller SSBJs. 
2.2. Reasons for the use of business aircraft 
Business aircraft are valued for their flexibility. An owner or 
user can fly them to any place, at any time. He is not 
dependent of fixed airline schedules, and he can change 
the destination even in the middle of flight. 
Moreover, business planes provide for safety, privacy and 
a good working environment. Usually, the occupants are 
an associated travelling group which makes it possible to 
use the time in the “flying office” productively, by having 
team meetings, for instance. 
Also, private jets are said to present adequate ambience 
for fostering social contacts. The airplane often imposes a 
lasting impression upon business partners or guests. 
But mostly, considerable amounts of time can be saved by 
using business aircraft which is especially precious for 
high net-worth individuals or in situations with time 
pressure. Circumstantial check-ins, security controls and 
delays at crowded airports are avoided. Destinations can 
be reached in more direct ways; it is even possible to visit 
several of them on one day. For these reasons, business 
jets are occasionally described as “time machines”. 
2.3. Modes of operation for business aircraft 
Business jets are, in several aspects, the air travel 
counterpart to limousines with a driver. They are 
predominantly flown “on-demand” or “non-scheduled”. 
Quick dispatchability is paramount – the operator often 
guarantees the owner or customer a maximum duration 
after which the aircraft has to be available. 
Business jets operate on large international airports rather 
seldom, since slots are preferentially given to airlines. In 
most cases, general aviation or regional airports like 
London-Farnborough (FAB), New York-Teterboro (TEB) or 
Paris-Le Bourget (LBG) are used since they provide for 
quick access and dispatch and they charge lower fees. 
Plus, many small airports have specialised for business 
aviation, offering MRO services. 
According the National Business Aviation Association 
(NBAA), only 550 airports in the US are serviced by 
airlines, whereas over 5,000 are used by business aircraft. 
Thus, business airplanes are said to often not replace the 
airline flight, but to fly routes that airlines don’t offer at all. 
Below, several modes of operation for business aircraft 
are presented. 
2.3.1. In-house flight departments 
Most business planes are operated by companies whose 
business model is not directly attached to the operation of 
their airplanes and which run an own flight department [2]. 
Among those, there are many global enterprises; but most 
of them are U.S.-American small businesses that incur 
increased demand for service or consultation. 
These so-called corporate flight departments usually lease 
or own only one or two airplanes. Operations are managed 
by a proprietary team at an airport near the company and 
in an own hangar. Maintenance tasks are sometimes 
given to local MRO suppliers. 
2.3.2. Governmental flight departments 
Most governments of larger countries own and operate 
own fleets. The aircraft are mostly used for VIP 
transportation, but also for aerial surveillance, as 
command bridges in military scenarios and for cargo 
transportation. Usually, their fleet encompass several 
aircraft. [2] 
2.3.3. Charter 
Charter airplanes (and helicopters) in air transportation are 
correlated to taxies in road traffic. The client only names 
time and destination and subsequently betakes himself in 
the hands of the charter company. For him, only the cost 
of operation plus a profit margin are charged, which is 
particularly attractive in case of low travel demand. 
About one quarter of all business jets are run by charter 
companies. Their fleets often span several planes of 
different size and make of advanced age. [2] 
2.3.4. Aircraft management 
The occurrence of owner operated aircraft diminishes with 
aircraft size. Turbine driven jets or turboprops are mostly 
given to the hands of a company that offers administration, 
operation and maintenance of third-party aircraft. The 
client pays a monthly fee and the direct operating cost 
which is passed on to him without surcharge. 
In order to use the airplane productively in non-occupied 
hours, many clients allow the operator to charter out their 
aircraft. Since most of the charter companies cannot afford 
their own airplane, these “managed airplanes” constitute 
the backbone of the charter industry. The companies keep 
15% of the flight charge by default and pass the rest on to 
the owner. [3] 
2.3.5. Fractional aircraft management 
So-called fractional companies offer a special kind of third-
party operation. Clients purchase a fraction or „share“ of 
an airplane from the company which can be between 1/32 
or one half, but mostly 1/16 to 1/4. Aside from ownership 
cost, a monthly management and maintenance fee is 
charged, plus a usage fee for the plane and fuel cost. 
According to his ownership share, the client gets the same 
fraction of the yearly occupied hours which are fixed to 800 
in total. As a consequence of the business model, clients 
seldom travel in their own plane as their jet will be in 
service for another client or in a remote place at most 
times. 
Nearly the whole market is controlled by four U.S. 
companies: NetJets, Flight Options, Flexjet and Citation-
Shares. Among these, NetJets is the biggest, operating 
400 of about 1,000 fractional aircraft worldwide, aside from 
being the only fractional company with branches outside 
the U.S., namely in Europe. 
 
3. SUPERSONIC FLIGHT 
3.1. Physical characteristics 
Flying beyond sonic speed, physical phenomena appear 
that complicate the technical and economically sustainable 
feasibility of supersonic flight concepts dramatically and 
that are ultimately responsible for civilian supersonic flight 
not having been able to make a breakthrough. 
To name the greatest handicaps of supersonic design: 
Wave drag; entirely different speed regions during flight 
missions; engine noise at takeoff; hull heating; movement 
of the aerodynamic center; cabin pressurization. Yet, for 
operational aspects, the sonic boom is of highest 
relevance. 
As long as an object moves faster than the speed of sound 
(Mach 1) in the atmosphere, it trails detonation shocks 
which are perceived as sudden double bangs in some 
distance. The pressure fluctuation can at worst cause 
damage to people or buildings on the ground. With 
airplanes the size of business jets, it can be assumed that 
physical damages occur utmost seldom. However, the 
mental effect, namely the shock “out of the blue”, is 
verified to be unacceptable for considerable fractions of 
the public [4]. 
3.2. The supersonic overland flight ban 
By the time the power of Concorde’s sonic boom became 
generally known, nearly all industrial countries enacted 
laws to constrain supersonic flight over land. Usually, the 
boom was not allowed to reach the ground, which means 
that supersonic flight up to the so-called “cutoff Mach 
number” (about 1.15) is allowed which is the case in 
Germany (LuftVO §11a), for instance. Only the U.S. ban 
supersonic civil flight entirely (FAR 91, §817). 
This restrictive, albeit quite justified legislation is effective 
to this day, having highest influence on weal and woe of 
any supersonic transport. It definitely prohibited a greater 
success of the Concorde program. Any abolition, 
relaxation or modification of the regulations is only 
probable on the long run. 
3.3. Known SSBJ designs 
SSBJs have been studied since the middle of the 1980s. 
Russian Sukhoi OKB exhibited the design of a plane 
called S-21 in 1989. It was intended to reach double sonic 
speed and to transport 8 to 12 passengers over distances 
of 4000 nautical miles. 
In spite of intermittent co-operation with Gulfstream, the 
project had as little success as several others to follow. 
TABLE 2 shows the most serious designs in our eyes. 
Remarkably, since those days, the specifications have 
remained the same: Nearly all designs address the 
transportation of about 8 persons on ranges of 4000 nm. 
Speed is never the primary parameter of optimization. It 
only needs to be well above the speed of sound. 
3.4. Low-boom design 
So-called low-boom jets constitute the most recent trend in 
SSBJ design. By expert shaping of the aerodynamic hull, 
the acoustic signature can be manipulated in a way that 
the boom is perceived less intensely on the ground [5]. 
The downside of hitherto existing low-boom concepts is 
the serious surrender of aerodynamic efficiency which 
reflects in the takeoff weight of such designs (see TABLE 
2). The QSST drafted by Lockheed Martin’s Skunk Works 
for instance was claimed to produce a sonic boom that 
would have 1/100th the strength of Concorde’s. At the 
same time, its planned takeoff weight turned out to be 70% 
higher compared to the Aerion’s which was designed for 
about the same mission and payload requirements.
TABLE 2.  
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] 
Design year 2010 2009 ? 1993 2009 2009 2009 2010 2009 
Purchase price planned ($) 80M 80M 50M 50M - - - - - 
Design range (nm) 4000 4000 4000 4000 4000 5000 4000 4000 5000 
Design cruise Mach 1.5 1.6 2 2 1.6 1.6 1.8 1.6 1.8 
Passengers (typ. / max.) 8 / 12 8 / 12 6 / 10 8 / ? 8 / ? 8 / ? 8 / ? 6 / 8 6 / 8 
Length (m) 45.2 40.3 36.0 40.5 36.8 41.6 40.9 38.1 50.4 
Span (m) 19.6 19.2 16.2 19.9 18.5 24.0 19.1 20.0 21.0 
Max. thrust (kN) 174.4 294.0 190.3 220.7 220.0 313.5 292.6 ? 226.0 
Max. takeoff weight (t) 40.8 69.4 41.0 51.8 51.1 60.5 53.3 43.1 54.1 
Balanced field length (ft) 6000 7500 6000 6500 6266 6119 6375 6255 6000 
Sonic boom intensity (dBA) - 55 - - 86 85 68.5 77.7 (.4 psf) 
4. MARKET ASSESSMENT 
4.1. Business aviation analysis and forecasts 
Sales of turbine powered business aircraft totalled $24B in 
2008; more than 1300 planes were rolled out. This was the 
apex of a boom lasting several years, followed by the 
shock of the world financial crisis starting in the middle of 
2008. However, all serious forecasts [8, 9, 10, 11] are 
expecting recovery on the long run, mainly driven by the 
unremitting demand from booming emerging markets like 
Brazil, Russia, India and China. The US market appears to 
be comparatively sated and slow. 
Prior to the worldwide economic downturn, the revenue 
caused by large jets – those costing more than $24M – 
traditionally encompassed about half of the total turbine 
airplane market. In 2009, deliveries for the lower business 
aircraft segment ($4M - $24M) fell a catastrophic 42.8%, 
whilst for more expensive jets, only 4.1% less were 
delivered. The upper market proved remarkably immune to 
economic fluctuations and largely decoupled from the 
most reliable indicator for the business jet market which is 
corporate profits. [11] 
In the medium term, high end jets are expected to be the 
most important growth driver regarding worth. Price does 
not appear to be an obstacle, rather the contrary. Price 
elasticity is very low in the upper segment; some clients 
seem to be willing to pay about any sum just to own the 
best product the market has to offer. [12] 
In 2008, there were 16,000 business jets and 10,000 
operators worldwide; thus, the latter are responsible for 
only one plane in most cases. The U.S. still own more than 
double as much jets compared to the rest of the world. [11] 
Regarding long range jets, only 59% are stationed in the 
U.S. Since 2007, more than half of the new aircraft have 
been delivered to the rest of the world. These days, more 
than 200 long range jets are rolled out yearly (see 
FIGURE 1). 
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FIGURE 1.      Long range business jet deliveries 
At this time, about 2,500 high end business jets of newer 
year of construction (price > $30M, not built before 2000) 
are in service. This information was obtained by a data call 
from the ACAS data base (AirCraft Analytical System, 
flightglobal.com) on October 25th, 2010. From the same 
source, the operational figures of some aircraft models 
could be derived, see TABLE 3. 
TABLE 3. 
Business jet utiliz. 
Mean mission 
block time (h) 
Mean yearly 
utilization (h) 
Challenger 604 2,02 342 
Global 5000 2,59 248 
Global Express 2,73 281 
Falcon 2000 1,66 270 
Falcon 2000EX 1,68 378 
Falcon 50EX 1,59 278 
Falcon 900EX 2,17 340 
Legacy 600 2,04 289 
G450 2,01 216 
G550 2,51 329 
Obviously, large business jets are predominantly operated 
way below capacity, regarding mission range as well as 
regarding utilization. For one, all jets listed are able to 
cruise for at least 8 hours. Further, fractional companies 
manage to have their jets flying more than 800 hours per 
year; airliners usually chalk up 3,000 to 4,000 hours. 
4.2. Calculation of operating cost 
In order to be able to estimate the cost of operation for 
SSBJs, a semi-empirical model was developed. Its main 
purpose is not finding exact costs but to provide a means 
of cost comparison between subsonic and supersonic 
business jets. 
4.2.1. Modelling method 
The tool created is geared to a well-established software 
that calculates variable operating cost and yearly fixed 
cost. With the help of publicly available cost breakdowns of 
several aircraft types, arithmetical correlations were found 
for single cost items by regression. However, some items 
cannot be reproduced without insider knowledge; they had 
to be obtained by best guessing. 
In short, variable cost per hour encompasses fuel, main-
tenance, engine parts, engine overhaul, landing fees, crew 
expenses, and catering. Annual fixed cost includes crew 
salary, hull insurance, refurbishment reserves, a computer 
maintenance program, and weather service. Depreciation 
cost is calculated by multiplying a prevalent interest rate 
with the aircraft price. Total cost is the sum of said items. 
The greatest expenses by far when operating SSBJs will 
certainly result from ownership on the one hand and from 
fuel consumption on the other hand. These two items are 
easy to determine for known designs. Thus, results of 
good validity can be expected regarding cost of SSBJs. 
4.2.2. Results 
In order to compare total cost, calculations were made for 
the Aerion jet as well as for the low boom designs HISAC-
C and SAI QSST (see TABLE 3), assuming unrestricted 
cruise speed (Mach 1.5 or 1.8 and 1.6 respectively). 
Purchasing price was set to $80M for all SSBJs, fuel price 
was set to $5.41 per gallon which was about the average 
of 2010. As a reference, the 7X by Dassault Falcon and 
the Global 5000 by Bombardier were chosen. 
First, we took the demand constrained perspective of a 
non-commercial owner and user who has a fixed yearly 
need for travel. This need was assumed to be 200,000 
nautical miles which translates to realistic 465 flight hours 
per year, implying an average flight velocity of 430 knots.  
In this case, total cost of travel (cost regarding distance), 
resulting from variable and fixed cost as well market 
depreciation, is clearly higher for SSBJs compared to their 
subsonic counterparts (see FIGURE 2). For a user with 
limited travelling requirements intending to acquire a 
SSBJ, the higher speed and the promise of prestige has to 
outweigh the monetary disadvantage. This correlation has 
proven to be valid for any magnitude of travel need. 
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FIGURE 2. Cost of travel, fixed demand 
Next, we took a supply constrained perspective. 
Commercial operators usually intend to utilize their aircraft 
well in order to compensate their fixed cost as soon as 
possible. For instance, fractional companies aim for 800 
block hours yearly on their jets; more hours cannot be 
attained for operational reasons. 
The cost of operation (hourly cost) of the supersonic jets is 
more than double compared to the traditional business 
jets, presenting a high entry threshold (see FIGURE 3). 
The picture changes when looking at cost of travel: While 
it still soars high above all others for the low-boom QSST, 
it is only slightly higher for the efficient Aerion jet and the 
moderately boom-optimized HISAC-C compared to the 
subsonic long range jets (see FIGURE 4). 
By means of this moderate rise in travel cost and 
considering their additional productivity, efficient SSBJs 
pose an interesting business option for commercial 
operators. For one, fractional companies would be able to 
sell about double the aircraft shares, since the user would 
only require half of the flight time for the same travel need. 
Even in the likely case of doubling fuel cost, the ratios 
presented degrade only marginally to the disadvantage of 
the SSBJs. 
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FIGURE 3. Cost of operation, fixed supply 
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FIGURE 4. Cost of travel, fixed supply 
4.3. Analysis of traffic volume 
European air traffic control agency EUROCONTROL 
provides exact statistics regarding flight movements in, 
from, and to Europe. It is even possible to have dedicated 
business aviation flows. As Europe is too small for long 
haul flights (supposed to be further than 2500 nm), only 
incoming and leaving flows were taken into consideration. 
Movements between Europe and North America account 
for the great majority (see FIGURE 5), followed by those to 
and from Arabia (Saudi-Arabia and UAE). Strong seasonal 
fluctuations differing between regions can be noted. Also, 
business flight movements are strongly dependent of the 
economic situation: From the peak in 2007 until 2009, they 
slipped about 25% on average (not shown here). 
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FIGURE 5. Average daily business flights to and from 
Europe regarding various world regions  
For the rest of the world, data about long haul business 
aviation flows is not available. Yet, considering the fact 
that North America and Europe account for about 80% of 
long range jet ownership, we assume that most long haul 
business flights are taking place in the North Atlantic and 
that this situation is going to persist for quite some time. 
The next important region appears to be the Northern 
Pacific, followed by North America-Middle East flights. All 
these routes have high overwater percentages. Even 
flights between the U.S. East Coast and the Middle East 
are possible with detours of as little as 5% of the great 
circle distance if routing them over the Mediterranean Sea. 
4.4. A survey among business jet operators 
In order to learn the opinion of decision makers from the 
business aviation sector and to collect key figures of flight 
operation, an internet based questionnaire was created. 
Subsequently, companies were addressed that manage 
large, long range business jets. 
In total, 718 survey invitations were received by the 
addressees and 93 questionnaires were completed. We 
were able to gather the following set of data (whereat 
slight corruption to the favour of the participants, whether 
committed knowingly or not, should be reckoned with): 
– The great majority of long range jets is flown 300 to 
600 hours yearly. (Compare to CHART 3.) 
– About 60% of the routes flown are less than 3,000 
nautical miles of distance. (Compare to CHART 3.) 
– On more than 80% of long haul flights, 6 passengers 
are transported at most; 7 to 9 seats are considered 
sufficient for most of these flights. 
– For a SSBJ, 10 to 13 seats are desired; 7 to 9 are 
seen as a minimum. 
– Regarding the adequate range for most long haul 
flights, 5,000 nm are given in most cases. 
– The ideal range for a SSBJ is more than 5,000 nm in 
the eyes of most participants; as a minimum, 4,000 
nm would be accepted. 
– The average overwater percentage of the depart-
ments’ long haul flights is widely spread, yet it tends to 
be less than 50%. 
– Most of the survey participants guess the chance for 
their flight department acquiring a SSBJ in spite of an 
overland flight ban to be zero. In case the ban is lifted, 
the chance is seen as 50% in most cases, but still 
tends to be negative. 
– As a benchmark, a 10 hours flight in a large cabin, 
long range jet was given (perhaps a Gulfstream V or a 
Bombardier Global Express). Subsequently, 
participants were asked to estimate the monetary 
benefit of a 7, 6, 5, or 4 hours flight respectively in a 
midsize cabin SSBJ (comparable to a Gulfstream 
G200 or a Bombardier Challenger 300 cabin) with 
regard to the former flight. The benefit of the 7 hours 
flight is estimated to be 16% on average; in case of 6 
hours: 27%; 5 hours: 48%, 4 hours: 74%. 
The results gained give valuable insights regarding the 
operation of current long range jets. Also, they leave the 
impression that operators are not outright enthusiastic 
about the prospect of supersonic business jets, even more 
so assuming that the ones having answered our call 
belong to the rather positive fraction of the industry. 
4.5. Potential consumers of SSBJs 
4.5.1. Corporate flight departments 
Given the high cost, it will predominantly be large 
corporations that will be able to afford a SSBJ. Such firms 
often possess several aircraft, and a SSBJ would perfect 
their fleets on the upper end. 
However, the management needs to be able to 
convincingly justify the acquisition of an airplane in front of 
the board and the shareholders, which might be an issue 
regarding the poor utility of a speed constrained SSBJ on 
the one hand and on the other hand, the even higher 
operating cost as well as possibly bad publicity caused by 
a low boom jet. 
All told, we estimate the possible corporate demand for 
SSBJs to be rather low. 
4.5.2. Government agencies 
Low boom jets could be the ultimate means of 
transportation for government officials where time savings 
are prized much higher than operating cost. Also, power 
will be represented adequately by a prestigious SSBJ. The 
military and secret services will doubtlessly have interest in 
supersonic airplanes for passenger transportation, first 
and foremost as a means to quickly respond to emerging 
political developments. 
Quite independently from the size of the jet, it can be 
assumed that at least large industrial and emerging 
nations are going to order several copies. In case of speed 
constrained jets, a considerably smaller market has to be 
expected as time advantages diminish in many cases. The 
size of the jet is thought to be comparatively irrelevant. 
Being able to transport a team over long distances in 
supersonic speed should be reason enough to buy one. 
The market potential for governmental use could prove 
substantial. However, governmental agencies are neither 
likely to act as launch customers nor to dictate 
requirements for civil aircraft. For these reasons, this 
mode of operation should not be considered for the layout 
of SSBJs. 
4.5.3. Private individuals 
Private individuals buy long range jets predominantly for 
prestige reasons. They often use them to fly on holidays 
where flight duration is quite unimportant. Also, they 
frequently have their plane run and chartered out by 
management companies to increase its otherwise marginal 
utilization. 
Anyway, a supersonic business jet would pose the ultimate 
status symbol, similar to a super sports car that can gladly 
be presented to ones guests and that is not in use very 
often, while a SSBJ is of a whole different magnitude. One 
can speculate that many a Russian oligarch, an American 
billionaire, super rich Chinese, Indians, sheikhs will strive 
for a copy. In those circles, money plays a subordinate 
role; the main point is occupying a superlative. 
This group represents strong market potential. At the 
same time, the specifications of a SSBJ should be of low 
importance as long as it reflects a passable utility. Bigger 
will certainly be better, but if a small group can be fitted in 
neatly, that fact should give enough reason to buy one. 
Consequently, the wishes of this group should not be 
regarded as direct requirements; yet, their standards for 
room and comfort need to be taken into account. 
4.5.4. Charter companies 
There are only a handful of charter companies in existence 
worldwide that operate their own new long range jets. For 
this reason, their wishes are of little relevance when 
designing aircraft, the more so as they widely match the 
needs of private owners. A purchasing demand for SSBJs 
is estimated to be hardly present. 
4.5.5. Fractional companies 
Since a speed constrained SSBJ will be inflexible and a 
low boom jet will be all the costlier, in most cases, the 
benefit will come out too low for a prospective buyer 
judging upon usefulness so as to aim for full ownership. 
However, a SSBJ can be of real value, especially when 
the cost of travel is only slightly higher compared to large 
long range jets, as has been described in 4.2.2. 
This situation renders the fractional model very attractive 
for supersonic business aircraft. In comparison to full 
ownership, only a marginal investment is needed for 
benefitting from supersonic travel on the seldom flown 
long haul. Especially companies that less care for prestige 
than for the time of their employees and that do not have 
the need to fully utilize a SSBJ would probably embrace 
such an offer. 
Under objective circumstances, this business model 
should be able to support more SSBJs than full ownership. 
Yet, it is all but certain that the oftentimes loss-making 
fractional companies would take the risk of an entry 
investment worth hundreds of million Dollars for a fleet of 
SSBJs. We estimate that, if anything, a dozen SSBJs will 
be acquired and deployed in London and New York in 
order to test the market. Great initial euphoria is not to be 
expected from the side of fractional firms. 
4.6. Synthesis of market estimation 
Seeing the market share and future potential of long range 
business jets, a success of a SSBJ program appears to be 
at least imaginable. 200 of the largest, heaviest and most 
expensive jets are sold per year, and this segment is 
thought to have the greatest growth potential. Diverse 
market analysis [12, 13, 14, 15] justify starting a SSBJ 
development with a yearly demand of about 20 SSBJs. 
This number does not seem unrealistic today and even 
less so for the future. Nevertheless, a sufficient demand is 
neither certain nor verifiable. Thus, it can be understood 
why no established manufacturer has ever committed itself 
to a full fledged SSBJ program. 
In any case, one has to assume that none of the modes of 
operation mentioned will alone suffice to warrant the 
development of a SSBJ, as has also been denoted by 
Chudoba et al. [16]. For this reason, a SSBJ design should 
always allow for additional applications, as an express 
cargo transport or as a small airliner, for instance. 
Furthermore regarding the sonic boom issue, it is difficult 
to tell which concept will perform best on the market for 
small supersonic transports: A design centered upon 
efficiency (like the Aerion jet) that neglects its sonic boom 
and thus becomes uneconomic when often used on 
overland flights? Or a design strictly trimmed for boom 
reduction (like the SAI QSST) that – in the arguable case 
of lifted bans – will be deployable worldwide, while being 
very costly and likely to face strong political headwinds 
concerning its environmental impact when its excessive 
fuel consumption becomes widely known? 
Given the present socio-cultural mainstream and 
respective topics (e. g. sustainability, renewable energies, 
climate change, air pollution, economy crises, executive 
bashing), it cannot be assumed that in the foreseeable 
future, parliamentary majorities will gather to lift civil 
supersonic overland flight bans. Supersonic jets are prone 
to condemnation as anachronisms. 
For this reason, we hold the more promising approach to 
be an efficient, conventional design that bears less risk 
and cost and that does not require legislative changes, 
instead of having to get across to politics and society with 
a very controversial low boom concept that additionally 
represents potential nuisance and that will probably be 
subject to severe regulatory burdens. 
Ultimately for jets with strong sonic boom, commercial 
operation seems to be more likely, ergo done by fractional 
or charter companies (if not even airlines), where a small 
supersonic transport can be dedicated to overwater routes 
and where fuel efficiency overrides flexibility. On the other 
hand, private individuals, companies, and government 
agencies that value their freedom to fly supersonic 
anywhere higher than the extra charge on operating cost 
will probably prefer a low boom jet. 
 
5. SSBJ REQUIREMENTS DEFINITION 
Below, the most promising top level requirements for 
supersonic business jets are presented from our view. 
5.1. Cruise speed 
Regarding cruise speed, requirements from possible 
modes of operation are less decisive than, in fact, 
technical feasibilities regarding engine layout. For this 
reason, cruise speed should adapt to technical conditions 
within certain limits. 
The primary purpose of propulsion is accelerating the 
airplane through the drag intensive transonic speed 
regime (about 0,8 < Ma < 1,2) to its supersonic cruise 
speed and keeping it there for a longer period of time: The 
faster the airplane, the higher the necessary exhaust jet 
velocity and the lower the ideal engine airflow bypass ratio. 
Simultaneously, high exhaust jet velocities result in loud 
engines on takeoff. In order to meet present and future 
stringent noise abatement regulations, an engine basically 
needs a bypass ratio as high as possible. This would result 
in large engine cross sections and consequently in high 
supersonic drag. These requirements are contradictory: 
The higher the desired cruise speed, the less probable is 
complying with takeoff noise limits. 
Furthermore, starting at about Mach 1.7, variable engine 
inlets are required to prevent major total pressure losses 
and the dwindling efficiency accompanying the former. 
Variable inlets are complex to develop and to maintain; for 
this reason, they should be avoided on SSBJs. Besides 
that, the most efficient flight levels increase with speed, 
and so does the harmfulness of emissions into the 
atmosphere. Also for reasons of hull heating, implying the 
use of non-exotic materials, Mach 1.7 is considered the 
upper limit. 
In the end, a cruise speed as high as possible between 
Mach 1.2 and 1.7 should be aimed for. However, future 
noise regulations will significantly determine the final 
possibilities. 
5.2. Cabin and capacity 
The mentioned survey showed that private long range 
flights seldom carry more than 6 passengers. As a 
minimum, 7 to 9 seats were chosen, which hereby is 
deemed appropriate. 
Double club seating which predominates in medium sized 
business jets is well suited for this application. Optionally, 
two seats can be interchanged with a 3 person sofa. The 
aisle should be at least 1.85 to 1.9 meters high to provide 
for adequate headroom for people used to larger jets.  
5.3. Range 
The unique selling point of a supersonic jet is its speed. 
Even if it has to refuel on longer missions, it is still going to 
arrive a lot earlier than any other civil airplane. The longer 
the distance, the greater can the willingness of the 
passengers be assumed to accept a technical stop. 
This means that creating a small supersonic airplane for 
very long distances makes little sense, particularly 
because technical requirements and costs increase 
enormously compared to a less ambitious design. Yet, the 
most important missions should be accomplishable without 
refuelling to center the maximum benefit of a SSBJ upon 
this market. 
Thus, a SSBJ should at least be able to cover all routes 
between the U.S. East Coast and Western Europe, as 
shown in 4.3. For this purpose, 7,400 km = 4,000 nm is 
considered adequate. This way, Miami, the most remote 
East Coast metropolis, can be connected to London, 
Paris, and Madrid. In the next important region, the North 
Pacific, a range of at least 7,515 km would be required just 
to bridge the closest metropolises, Vancouver and Tokyo. 
Also, a minimum range of 4,000 nm emerged from our 
survey. We regard said range, flown with 6 passengers 
and NBAA IFR reserves, as an optimum. 
5.4. Runway length 
For being able to use the same runways as long range 
business jets, SSBJs need to feature a so-called balanced 
field length (BFL) of about 6,000 ft (see CHART 1). 
Considering CHART 2, BFLs between 6,000 and 6,500 ft 
appear realistic from a technical viewpoint. We shall now 
assess whether this requirement is really obligatory with 
regard to operability. 
First of all, a SSBJ should be able to operate on as many 
general aviation (GA) airports as possible. Since a SSBJ 
can only adequately exert its speed advantage on 
intercontinental flights, relevant airports should additionally 
be open to international travel. That means they have to 
be declared as airports of entry (AoE) and they have to 
dispose of their own customs office, which becomes 
increasingly seldom with decreasing airport size and 
runway length accordingly. 
For SSBJs, airports near large economic centers have to 
be considered in particular, as most long haul business 
flights will supposedly take place between such areas. A 
list of several dozens of the most relevant metropolises 
and their airports was compiled by the authors. It became 
clear that in most cases, only western cities have 
proprietary GA AoEs. Yet, all others can be reached by 
business aircraft via their international hubs, often without 
slot restrictions. It can be assumed that in the latter case, 
the runway length will always suffice. 
Important GA AoEs with runway lengths short of 8,000 ft 
are regarded as critical, in case their respective hub 
requires slots or is remote from the city center or generally 
sees little business aviation. At least one of these criteria 
is fulfilled by the following airports: 
– Rome-Ciampino     CIA   7,244 ft 
– London-Luton      LTN   7,087 ft 
– Jorge Newbery (Buenos Aires)    AEP   6,890 ft 
– Chicago-Midway     MDW   6,522 ft 
– Roskilde (Copenhagen)    RKE   5,900 ft 
– Stockholm-Bromma     BMA   5,472 ft 
– Seletar (Singapur)     XSP   5,223 ft 
London Luton Airport is the most important GA airport of 
entry nearby the world’s most important financial center; 
from here, a SSBJ should be able to lift off with maximum 
takeoff weight in any case. In Buenos Aires, slot-free 
Ezeiza hub could be used to refuel in case of need. The 
runways of Roskilde, Bromma, and Seletar appear too 
short anyway; slots will need acquiring. In Chicago, a very 
important economic area, there is no reasonable 
alternative to Midway Airport. Yet, it seems exaggerated to 
postulate a BFL that is 500 ft shorter only for this reason. 
In summary, we do not see the necessity for a BFL of 
6,000 ft. 6,500 ft are regarded as desirable, a maximum of 
7,000 ft is definitely essential. 
The landing distance of jet aircraft is generally shorter than 
their BFL. Anyway, it should also be 7,000 ft at most. 
As low boom SSBJs tend to require increased flexibility in 
order to meet the needs of their users, they might have to 
allow for operation on even shorter runways. 
6. CONCLUSION 
In the present work, the market environment for 
supersonic business jets (SSBJs) was discussed under 
consideration of different consumers and modes of 
operation. The work included analysis and forecasts for 
the whole business aviation segment, assessment of past 
SSBJ designs, an operating cost model, air traffic data and 
a survey among large business jet operators. 
We found that both non-commercial entities and 
commercial operators come into consideration as SSBJ 
users, the former rather regarding low boom, the latter 
rather regarding conventional SSBJs. Commercial modes 
of operation appear to pose a sensible business case, 
since while being a lot more productive, only a moderate 
increase in travel cost has to be taken. Yet, there is 
probably no strong demand from one single application 
that would justify the development of a SSBJ. Hence, the 
aircraft should be designed in a way that it can be used 
miscellaneously. 
Following this appraisal, top-level requirements for the 
SSBJ to be designed within the project VIP-3 were drafted: 
A cruise Mach number short of 1.7, a cabin for about 8 
persons, a still air range of 4,000 nautical miles, and 
operability on 7,000 ft runways were deemed adequate. 
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